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CASE NOTES
Securities Law—Ten Percent Stock Ownership—Prerequisite to
Section 16(b) Short-Swing Liability—Provident Securities Co. v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc.'—In late 1968 Provident Securities Com-
pany decided to liquidate its assets. Provident hoped to sell its assets
for cash since this would facilitate distribution of the proceeds of the
liquidation to its shareholders. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. expressed
an interest in purchasing Provident but desired to exchange its own
securities for the Provident assets. The parties eventually reached a
compromise whereby Provident agreed to accept Foremost conver-
tible debentures in exchange for two-thirds of Provident's assets.
Foremost agreed to register one-half of these debentures under the
relevant provisions of the :Securities Act of 1933 2 promptly after
closing in order to permit them to be offered to the public. 3 Since
the debentures were immediately convertible into Foremost common
stock in excess of ten percent of Foremost outstanding shares, 4
Provident became a beneficial owner of ten percent of a class of
equity securities as provided in section 16(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 5 An underwriting agreement was executed on
October 21, 1969. Under that agreement, Provident sold one of the
debentures. On October 24, additional debentures were distributed
by Provident to its shareholders and Provident ceased to be a ten
percent owner of Foremost securities. The underwriting agreement
was closed on October 28 and the cash was distributed to Provident
shareholders on the following day. 6
Subsequently, Provident brought an action for a declaratory
judgment to determine its non-liability to Foremost for short-swing
profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 7
506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
2
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-g (1970).
3 506 F.2d at 603.
4 Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
6 506 F.2d at 604.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
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Foremost counterclaimed for a declaration of liability and recovery
of profits.° On cross motions for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held
that Provident was not liable for short-swing profits under section
16(b) since its sale of assets contained no potential for speculative
abuse of inside information. 9 Additionally, the district court
reasoned that a recovery by Foremost would result in a windfall and
perpetrate an inequity upon Provident. 10
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court" on the narrow basis of its
interpretation of the section 16(b) ownership proviso.' 2 The court of
appeals HELD: the initial purchase by which a person increases his
holdings to over ten percent of a corporation's securities is not a
section 16(b) transaction and thus there is no statutory strict liability
for profits from the sale of such holdings within six months from the
date of purchase." Since the acquisition by Provident was the initial
purchase which made it a ten percent owner of Foremost securities,
the court refused to impose liability for profits from the subsequent sale
of those securities."
The significance of Provident Securities lies in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the section 16(b) requirement that a beneficial
owner must be such "both at the time of purchase and sale" in order
for short-swing liability to attach. 15 The court construed this lan-
guage to mean that, in order for a beneficial owner to be liable for
profits obtained from a purchase and sale of corporate securities
completed within six months, such beneficial owner must be a ten
percent owner of the corporation's securities prior to the purchase in
question. 16 All of the circuits which have previously decided this
issue have construed the section 16(b) language to mean that one
becomes a ten percent owner simultaneously with the initial pur-
chase by which he increases his securities holdings to ten percent,
and therefore that liability will attach for profits obtained on any
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
9 Id. at 791-92.
1 ° Id. at 792.
" 506 F.2d at 614.
12 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), the ownership proviso of which states:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
13 506 F.2d at 614.
14 Id. at 615.
13 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
19 506 F.2d at 614.
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sale within six months. 17
 While the decision in Provident Securities,
by limiting the category of transactions to which short-swing liabil-
ity may attach, mitigates some of the harshness of section 16(b),
some may argue that the result creates a loophole which could
reduce its effectiveness."
Initially, this note will briefly present the policy considerations
underlying section 16(b). The rationale of Provident Securities will
then be analyzed and compared with prior decisions advocating the
alternative interpretation of the section 16(b) ownership proviso.
These two approaches will be compared and discussed in light of the
limited policies of section 16(b) and with regard to a logical statutory
construction of the plain language of section 16(b). Finally, to pro-
vide a sound basis for suggesting the proper interpretation of the
section 16(b) ownership proviso, the analysis will focus upon dicta in
recent Supreme Court decisions.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' 9 was
enacted to deter corporate insiders from engaging in short-swing
transactions in the securities of their own corporations. 2 ° This sec-
tion was designed to maintain investor confidence in a free and open
securities market by ensuring that individuals with access to inside
information do not abuse their fiduciary position. 2 ' In order to
achieve these objectives, section 16(b) provides for strict liability for
profits derived from transactions violating the statute. 22 Thus, any
corporate insider 23 engaging in a purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of his corporation's securities within a six month period
will be liable to the issuer for any profits resulting from the transac-
17
 See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir, 1970), aff'd on
other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
le See Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 20
(1934).
19
 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). For the text of § 16(b), see note 7 supra.
20
 Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1934).
The bill further aims to protect the interests of the public by preventing
directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation . . . from speculating
in the stock on the basis of inside information not available to others. . Such a
provision will render difficult or impossible the kind of transactions which were
frequently described to the committee, where directors and large stockholders par-
ticipated in pools trading in the stock of their own companies, with benefit of
advance information regarding an increase or resumption of dividends in some cases,
and the passing of dividends in others.
Id. For a discussion of some market practices which were common before the enactment of
§ 16(b), see Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, 59 Yale L.J. 510 (1950).
21 See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d. Cir. 1959).
22 Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970).
23
 For purposes of this discussion, "insider" includes directors, officers, and beneficial
owners of more than 10% of any class of equity security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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Lion. Such liability is not dependent upon proof of the insider's
intent or proof of the actual use of inside information. 24
Although section 16(b), by providing for strict liability, has
been condemned as unduly harsh, 25 the actual scope of its coverage
is narrow. Only those persons defined as corporate insiders by
section 16(a) can incur liability under section 16(b). 26 The drafters
concluded that these individuals not only had the greatest access to
inside information but also were in a position to manipulate corpo-
rate affairs to enhance their own trading positions. 27 Additionally,
the statute reaches only those situations where an insider is involved
in two transactions within a six month period. 28 This time limitation
is a recognition that the passage of six months is likely to neutralize
any advantage of the insider over the investing public that otherwise
would result from the insider's access to inside information. The
influence of impending events or corporate action upon market
prices would probably dissipate during this period. In addition, such
information may become public during the interim. Thus, holding
the securities for six months leads to an inference of bona fide long-
term investment. 29
While section 16(b) was written as a clear and easily applicable
provision, the courts have been presented with the problem of
construing the ambiguous section 16(b) ownership proviso, which
states that the section shall not cover any transaction where a
beneficial owner3 ° of ten percent of a class of equity securities was
not such "both at the time of purchase and sale . . . ."31 The specific
question presented by this language is whether the transaction by
which an individual acquires ten percent of a corporation's securities
should be construed as a purchase within the meaning of section
16(b) so that the individual will be liable for profits obtained from a
sale of those securities within six months. The court in Provident
Securities answered this question by holding that Provident was not
liable for the profits it had obtained from the sale of Foremost
debentures. 32 The court interpreted the statutory language as mean-
24
 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S:
751 (1943).
25
 Lowenfels, Regulation 16(b); A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cornell
L. Rev. 45, 64 (1968).
26
 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409 (1962). See note 23 supra.
22
 Hearings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6463-581 (1934),
21
 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
29
 See Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, 59 Yale L.J. 510, 511 (1950).
30
 The Securities Exchange Act contains no definition for beneficial owner. It has been
stated that a person is a beneficial owner when he has "a substantial property interest therein,
sufficient for the purposes of entering into [a] contract of sale; no particular form of legal or
equitable title is required to satisfy the requirements . . . ." Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp.
196, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd mem., 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966). See also L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1100-08 (2d ed. 1961).
31 15 U.S.C.	 78p(b) (1970). For the text of 	 16(b), see note 7 supra.
32 506 F.2d at 614.
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ing that the transaction by which one becomes a ten percent owner
cannot be used in determining liability under section 16(b)."
The Ninth Circuit justified its interpretation by noting initially
that section 16(b) creates a conclusive presumption that a statutory
insider who sells and purchases or purchases and sells within six
months does so with the intent to speculate rather than to invest."
Since this presupmtion is conclusive, the court believed that Con-
gress intended that the class of insiders be narrowly confined to
those who could have access to inside information. This class does
not include outsiders. 35
 Since one who increases his holdings to ten
percent of a corporation's shares is an outsider at the time he makes
the decision, for purposes of the statutory presumption, any inside
information in his possession could not have been obtained "by
reason of his relationship to the issuer. " 36
 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that this initial purchase is not within the in-
tended scope of section 16(b). 37
The court in Provident Securities was careful to limit its con-
struction to initial purchases which bring a shareholder over ten
percent ownership. 38
 Thus, it would not be possible for a ten
percent shareholder to sell below ten percent, repurchase at a profit
and claim immunity on the ground that at the time of repurchase, he
held less than ten percent of the outstanding shares. At the time of
repurchase the requisite inside relationship to the issuer would exist
by virtue of the shareholder's prior holdings. Therefore, in this case
such an individual would be held to become again a ten percent
owner simultaneously with the repurchase of securities. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that while such an interpretation would result in
two different applications of the same term, this result would be in
keeping with the basic rationale of section 16(b). 39 On the basis of
this reasoning, the court concluded that the exchange of Provident's
assets for Foremost debentures was the initial transaction in which
Provident acquired ten percent ownership of Foremost securities.
Since Provident had not been a ten percent owner prior to this
acquisition, it could not be liable for profits obtained from a sub-
sequent sale within six months."
In reaching its decision, the court in Provident Securities had
guidance only from the small amount of case law concerning the
ownership proviso of section 16(b). The first treatment of the issue
was the decision by Judge Kaufman on motion for summary judg-
ment in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.'" There, a sharehol-
33 Id.
3' Id. at 611.
35 Id. at 614.
36
 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
37 506 F.2d at 611-14.
31 Id. at 614.
36 Id.
4° Id. at 615.
104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Final disposition of the trial is reported at 132 F.
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der, in one purchase, increased his holdings of a corporation's stock
from 9.25 percent to 21 percent. Within six months of this purchase,
he sold some of his shares. 42 The federal district court interpreted
the language of the ownership proviso to mean that an individual
becomes a ten percent owner, within the terms of section 16(b),
simultaneously with the initial purchase which brings his holdings
above ten percent and therefore, that such a purchaser will be liable
for profits obtained from a subsequent sale within six months.'"
This interpretation was accepted by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit without comment."
In Stella, Judge Kaufman had concluded that the simultane-
ously with construction was the only one which could appropriately
effectuate the congressional purpose of deterring insider abuse. 45 He
expressed the fear that if the statute was construed to impose liabil-
ity only where the defendant held ten percent or more of the se-
curities prior to the initial purchase, a loophole would result which
would defeat the legislative intent. 46 Instead, Judge Kaufman be-
lieved that the ownership proviso was intended merely to exclude
the second sale in a two step sell down situation as a basis for
section 16(b) liability.° This application of the ownership proviso
would involve a ten percent owner engaging in two sales within six
months of the purchase. If the first sale reduced his holdings to
below ten percent, only profits obtained from the first sale would be
recoverable, since at the time of the second sale such individual
would no longer be a ten percent owner."
Judge Kaufman's simultaneous ownership interpretation of the
section 16(b) ownership proviso was reaffirmed in 1970 by the
Second Circuit, on slightly different grounds, in Newmark v. RKO
General, inc.," which involved a contract for the sale of stock to
RKO General in connection with the merger of Frontier Airlines
and Central Airlines. 50 RKO General owned 56 percent of Frontier's
shares and contracted with several Central shareholders to acquire
their shares. This transaction made RKO General a ten percent
owner of Central securities. Within six months of this purchase,
RKO General exchanged its Central shares for Frontier shares ac-
cording to the merger agreement." The court followed the Stella
Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), modified, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
42
 104 F. Supp. at 958.
43
 Id. at 960.
44 232 F.2d at 300-01.
43
 104 F. Supp. at 959.
46 Id. Judge Kaufman hypothesized that under the "prior to" construction, an individual
would be able to buy over ten percent and then sell under ten percent, therby reaping the
profits and repeating the process ad infinitum. But see 506 F.2d at 614-15.
47
 104 F. Supp, at 960.
41 Id.
41
 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
5 ° 425 F.2d at 351.
" Id, at 352.
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decision in determining that the initial transaction which made
RKO General a ten percent owner of Central securities was em-
braced by section 16(b). 52 The court reasoned that the reference to
ten percent owners in the statute rested on the presumption that
these individuals have access to inside information. The court rec-
ognized that while this presumption of access to inside information
could not be applied to the purchase in question, this purchase did
place the individual in a position of access to inside information
allowing a subsequent sale based on newly acquired knowledge.
Therefore the initial purchase "creates an opportunity for the kind
of speculative abuse the statute was enacted to prevent." 53 It would
appear, however, that this reasoning fails to account for the fact
that the language of section 16(b) applies a conclusive presumption
of use of inside information only to a pair of transactions completed
within six months. The court in Newmark recognized that such a
presumption could be applied rationally to only one transaction in
this situation and yet extended section 16(b) coverage to the initial
purchase," thus apparently extending the statute beyond the reach
of its express language.
The only other circuit to deal with the issue was the Eighth
Circuit, which also adopted the simultaneous ownership rule in
Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co. 55 In Emerson, a
corporation which had acquired 13.2 percent of the outstanding
common stock of another corporation pursuant to a tender offer sold
its holdings to below ten percent when its plan of a successful
takeover failed. 56 The court held section 16(b) applicable in this
situation since it believed that such an interpretation was necessary
to give full effect to the congressional purpose of deterring insider
abuse of inside information. 57
By examining the positions advocating the simultaneous owner-
ship interpretation, it can be seen that there does exist a logical,
52 Id. at 356.
33
 Id. This reasoning is similar to that in 16(b) cases where the transactions involved are
termed "unorthodox." In those cases, the court will examine the transaction to discover
whether any potential for the abuse of inside information at which 16(b) was aimed actually
existed. The court will "apply the statute only when its application would serve its goals."
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595 (1973). See also
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Blau v. Petteys, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.Zd 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
For a discussion of "unorthodox" transactions see 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1066-75 (2d ed. 1961). The court in Provident Securities had to deal with the subject of
unorthodox transactions. However, the court concluded that the exchange of assets for
securities was sufficiently orthodox so that a showing of potential for abuse was unnecessary
to decide whether § 16(b) had been violated. 506 F.2d at 605.
34
 425 F.2d 'at 356.
33
 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
Se' 434 F.2d at 920.
57 Id. at 924. See Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L.
Rev. 1 (1934).
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though perhaps unpersuasive, rationale for adoption of that in-
terpretation: while it is true that the terms of section 16(b) are
narrow, the primary objective of the statute is broad; that is, to
maintain investor confidence in the stock market by discouraging
short-swing insider trading. 58 Since section 16(b) can be avoided
easily it is necessary for the courts to interpret its terms liberally to
effectuate the congressional intent fully. In addition, proponents of
the simultaneous with interpretation of the ownership proviso could
argue that the bite of section 16(b) is not harsh. The statute is
basically remedial, not pena1. 59 If a defendant is found liable there
is no penalty, fine or even damages. The statute requires only a
disgorging of profits which places the defendant in the same position
he held before the forbidden transactions. 6° There is even a gener-
ous loophole provided for insiders by use of the two step sell down
procedure in certain situations." Utilizing this scheme, a clever
insider can still obtain substantial profits on the short swing. In
view of these factors, it has been argued that courts should be
reluctant to limit further the application of the statute lest it no
longer function as a deterrent to insider abuse. 62
Until Provident Securities, no circuit had adopted the prior to
interpretation. The rationale behind this interpretation was first
articulated by Judge Hincks, dissenting in Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors, Inc. 63 Judge Hincks believed that the court had an obliga-
tion to interpret the words of the statute in their ordinary sense and
to give effect to the plain language used by Congress." He found no
ambiguity in the statute. 65 The simultaneous ownership rule of the
majority was seen as inconsistent with the expressed congressional
intent. The statute, Judge Hincks argued, was based upon fiduciary
obligations owed to the corporation by controlling shareholders.
Under his analysis, Congress contemplated the imposition of the
statutory conclusive presumption of a breach of that duty only when
an individual completed both transactions within six months as an
58 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 2.35 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943),
58 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F,2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
6° However, there are cases where an insider will lose more than his profit. Where the
insider has engaged in multiple purchases and sales within a six month period, the court will
match the highest sale price with the lowest purChase price, even if the two transactions are
not directly related. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951); Smowlowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). Therefore an individual could sustain a net loss on the series of transactions and yet be
liable for additional funds under this method of profit computation.
61 See text at note 48 supra. This procedure was ratified by the Supreme Court in
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
62 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 924 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on
other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972)..
63 232 F.2d 299, 302-05 (2d Cir.) (Hincks, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
64 232 F.2d at 303 (Hincks, J,, dissenting).
63 Id. at 304 (Hincks, J., dissenting).
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insider." Since the proviso was consciously left as a loophole by
Congress after weighing the conflicting policies of overbreadth and
insider abuse, he believed that the court should merely give effect to
the plain language of section 16(b). 67 In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
v. W.R. Stephens Investment Co., 68 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas adopted the position advocated
by Judge Hinck's dissent without comment. 69
 Thus, the court re-
fused to include the initial purchase which made the defendant a ten
percent owner in computing recoverable profits after section 16(b)
liability was established. 70
The court in Provident Securities chose the position which it
regarded as the most consistent with the plain statutory language.
This interpretation appears to give full effect to the plain language
of Congress, and also seems to comport more fully with the limited
policy and scope intended by section 16(b).
First, it cannot be contended that Congress intended the own-
ership proviso to remain superfluous. However, the decisions in-
volving corporate directors and officers illustrate that this is the
result when the simultaneous ownership rule is adopted. Section
16(b) treats these insiders in a manner different from ten percent
owners of securities. There is no proviso in the section requiring
directors or officers to be such both at the time of purchase and
sale. 7 ' The reason for this difference is that officers and directors are
in a better position than are ten percent owners to acquire inside
information and to manipulate directly corporate affairs to their
own trading advantage. 72 Therefore, an individual who becomes a
director has been held liable under section 16(b) for a purchase and
sale of securities within six months, although that individual did not
become a director until after the purchase." An adoption of the
simultanious ownership rule would, in effect, treat ten percent own-
ers and other insiders alike, despite the distinctive treatment in the
section 16(b) ownership proviso. It cannot be maintained that the
proviso has no effect at all.
In Stella, Judge Kaufman rebutted this argument by adopting
the two step sell down interpretation. He contended that the proviso
was meant only to exclude the profits obtained from a second sale
within six months of a purchase of securities, providing that the first
sale reduced the shareholder's interest to below ten percent. 74 This
66
 Id. at 305 (Hincks, J., dissenting).
67 Id .
68
 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
69 Id. at 847.
7°
 Id.
71 See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
72
 Adler v, Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
73
 Id. at 840. See also Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970) (where defendant who purchased stock while a director but sold
after he left the board was held to be within § 16(b)).
74 104 F. Supp. at 960.
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is the result because at the time of the second sale the shareholder
would no longer be a ten percent owner. It is true that the proviso
will support such a result on these facts. However, it does not
appear that the plain language of the statute requires an interpreta-
tion that the applicability of the proviso is confined to this specific
factual pattern. If this application of the ownership proviso were the
only one possible, it would have the effect of always including
within the terms of section 16(b) a purchase which cannot be pre-
sumed to be based on inside information acquired through substan-
tial holdings, and yet exclude a second sale which, if the first sale is
presumed to be based on inside information, cannot rationally be
excluded from the scope of the presumption. Moreover, had Con-
gress intended such a narrow result it could have made that intent
more clear than appears from the broad language of the proviso.
Additionally, the prior to construction may comport more fully
with the limited policy and scope of section 16(b). Although the
legislative history on this point fails to illuminate the controversy,
the courts agree that where two conflicting interpretations of the
section are possible, that interpretation which best effectuates legis-
lative purpose must be applied. 75 Part of that legislative purpose
was to deter insiders from taking advantage of their position of
access to information not available to the public. 76 However, Con-
gress did not intend section 16(b) to cover all cases of abuse of inside
information. Rather, the section was designed to prevent the most
odious kind of abuse—the violation by powerful corporate insiders
of their fiduciary duties in managing corporate affairs. 77 Accord-
ingly, the statute was drafted narrowly to apply to the limited class
of individuals who were believed not only to have access to inside
information but also to be in a position of control from which
corporate affairs could be manipulated to an extent which would
make short-swing profits more easily attainable. 78
In addition, there is other evidence that Congress intended that
a narrow scope be given to the category of transactions for which
strict liability is imposed. Section 16(b) is aimed only at situations
where an insider engages in a purchase and sale within six months.
Therefore, an insider may engage in either a sale or a purchase of
securities with impunity under section 16(b), even where inside
information is used. 79 Similarly, an insider may purchase securities,
75
 Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972); accord, Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
79
 Section 16(b) was designed: "To protect the interests of the public against the preda-
tory operations of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing
them from speculating in the stock of corporations to which they owe a fiduciary duty." S.
Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
77 Id.
7 ° "Senator Gore. This [section 16(b)] is aimed at the general evil of officers and directors
rigging their stock up and down, and squeezing out their own stockholders. Corcoran. Yes."
Hearings on S. 84, S. 56 and S. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6559 (1934).
79
 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir)., cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
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wait six months and one day to sell, and not be accountable for any
profit." Apparently, Congress desired to keep the section's coverage
narrow so as not to discourage bona fide long term investment."
The operation of the simultaneous ownership interpretation
may be inconsistent with this narrow coverage accorded section
16(b). An individual who acquires an initial ten percent interest in a
corporation in one purchase and then sells within six months, is
engaging in only one transaction while an insider. In such a case
liability has been justified on the ground that once the individual
obtains over ten •percent of a corporation's securities, he has access
to inside information which can be used to his advantage in selling
within six months." This is not a strong justification, however,
since a director, officer, or long term ten percent owner can also
engage in only one transaction on the basis of inside information
within a six month period and yet be immune from section 16(b)'s
strict liability provisions. The section only imposes its conclusive
presumption that transactions were based on inside information where
there is a coupling of a purchase and a sale within six months. The ten
percent owner who sells securities within six months of the initial
purchase which gave him that interest is in no better position to
capitalize on inside information than is another insider who engages in
only one transaction in six months, and yet to whOm no section 16(b)
liability will attach. In fact, the potential abuses at which section 16(b)
was aimed are more likely to occur in the latter situations since those
insiders have far more time and opportunity to become acquainted
with corporate affairs and to engage in manipulative practices. Assign-
ing liability in one situation and not in the other would appear paradox-
ical and inequitable.
The fear of those opposing the prior to construction is that such
construction would enable an individual to purchase a large block of
a corporation's securities, sell the securities until his ownership was
just below ten percent and then repeat the process, ad infinitum,
without liability. 83 The court in Provident Securities , attempted to
solve this problem by adopting the prior to construction only in the
case of an initial purchase of ten percent interest. In dictum, the
Ninth Circuit stated that in all other situations, it would treat the
individual as a ten percent owner simultaneously with the repur-
chase of over ten percent of a class of equity securities." Such an
interpretation would apply two separate meanings to the same
(1965). However, liability could attach to such a transaction under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1974), 'if actual use of inside information were proven. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
ea B.T. Babbett, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964).
g' Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971).
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir. 1970).
83 Stella, 104 F. Supp. at 959.
64 506 F,2d at 614.
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statutory language. However, this approach would appear to be
consistent with the policy of the statute." Yet this interpretation
involves some sticky problems of its own. For instance, it is unclear
how long and under what circumstances the simultaneous owner-
ship interpretation would apply to the repurchase of securities. It is
conceivable that an individual would sell all of his holdings and
then repurchase a ten percent interest five years later. Would he be
held to have become a ten percent owner simultaneously with the
repurchase because of a relationship he enjoyed with the issuer five
years previously?
The real problem presented by the Ninth Circuit's dictum is
one of line drawing. The court in Provident Securities did not raise
this question, but it is implicit in the interpretation it gave to the
proviso. The problem could possibly be treated by the courts by
weighing the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the
ultimate responsibility for resolving this ambiguity lies with Con-
gress."
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the
proper construction of the section 16(b) ownership proviso, dicta in
some of its recent section 16(b) decisions seem to indicate a recognition
of the limited policies and scope of the statute, and in that way support
the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the scope of section 16(b)
liability. In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 87 the
Court, basing its decision upon the section 16(b) ownership proviso,
ratified the use of a two step sell down scheme to avoid libility for the
second sale." However, the question of whether an individual's initial
purchase of ten percent of a corporation's securities can be included
under section 16(b) was not before the Court." In rejecting the dissen-
ters' argument that all sales by a ten percent owner within six months
of a purchase are tainted because of the possibility of abuse of inside
information, 90 the Court stated:
While there may be logic in this position, it was clearly
rejected as a basis for liability when Congress included the
proviso that a 10% owner must be such both at the time of
the purchase and of the sale. Although the legislative his-
tory affords no explanation of the purpose of the proviso, it
may be that Congress regarded one with a long-term in-
vestment of more than 10% as more likely to have access
" Some engaging in buying and selling above and below ten percent has enjoyed an
access to inside information "by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970). Therefore, in these limited situations, the policy of 16(b) would be served by the
simultaneous ownership interpretation.
86 See text at notes 100-02 infra.
87 404 U.S. 418 (1972). For a discussion of this case see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 560 (1973). For the facts of this case see text at notes 55-57 supra.
88 404 U.S. at 420.
" Id. at 421.
9° Id. at 442 (dissenting opinion).
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to inside information than one who moves in and out of the
10% category. But whatever the rationale of the proviso, it
cannot be disregarded simply on the ground that it may be
inconsistent with our assessment of the "wholesome pur-
pose" of the Act."
Although this decision cannot be construed as an acceptance of
the prior to construction by the Court, it may be viewed as an
instance where the Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of section
16(b)'s strict liability terms. 92 This language is a recognition by the
Court that the explicit language of the ownership proviso cannot be
disregarded because of unexpressed policy objectives.
More recent Supreme Court dicta would seem to indicate that
the Court would be amenable to the prior to construction. Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 93
 involved a tender
offer campaign in which Occidental attempted a takeover of Kern.
These takeover efforts failed when Kern effected a defensive merger
with a third corporation. Occidental was then forced to exchange its
shares in Kern for shares of the new corporation. Kern brought suit
to recover Occidental's profits on the exchange." The Court re-
solved the case by deciding that the transactions did not have a
potential for the type of abuse at which section 16(b) was aimed. 95
The facts of Kern involved more than one tender offer, and
after the initial offer was accepted Occidental became a ten percent
owner. In briefly discussing this initial offer situation, the Court
stated: "[t]here is no basis for a finding that, at the time the tender
offer was commenced, Occidental enjoyed an insider's opportunity
to acquire .
 information about Old Kern's affairs." 96 Furthermore,
even if Occidental had made its initial tender offer on the basis of
some information not available to the public, this did not "represent
the kind of speculative abuse at which [section 16(b)] is aimed, for it
could not have been based on inside information obtained from
substantial stockholdings that did not yet exist." 97 This dicta would
seem to indicate that the Court views section 16(b) as encompassing
only those transactions in which a person has access to inside
information by reason of an insider relationship to the issuer both at
the time of the purchase and sale. That relationship cannot exist
simultaneously with the purchase which makes an individual a ten
percent owner, and therefore, under this analysis, no liability should
attach to the purchase under section 16(b).
91 Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 422.
93
 411 U.S. 582 (1973). For a discussion of this case see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 149 (1973).
94
 411 U.S. at 590.
93
 Id. at 600.
96 Id. at 596-97.
97 Id. at 597.
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The court in Provident Securities based its conclusions, in part,
upon this dicta by the Supreme Court. 98 Logically, it is a sound
position, and it need not be feared that such an interpretation will
place corporations and the public at the mercy of unscrupulous
speculating insiders. Many transactions which may ecape the lim-
ited purview of section 16(13)'s strict liability provisions can be
remedied by civil suits based on Rule 10b-5. 99
In the final analysis, it must be recognized that the ultimate
decision and responsibility for defining the full force and scope of
section 16(b) belongs to Congress. If the statute is to be broadened to
the extent that is envisioned by the simultaneous ownership rule,
that broadening should be done by Congress. The American Law
Institute has proposed a revised securities code which would incor-
porate the simultaneous ownership interpretation advanced by
Judge Kaufman in Stella.'" The drafters concede that a clarifica-
tion is necessary because that broad construction of the present
statutory language is questionable."' However, these are policy
judgments which properly belong in the legislative domain. The
courts can only rationally interpret the plain language of the present
statute. 102
The proper construction of the section 16(b) ownership proviso
has been a source of disagreement among courts and commentators
since the passage of the 1934 Act. A majority of courts, including all
courts of appeals which have decided the issue, have opted for the
simultaneous ownership interpretation. In Provident Securities, the
Ninth Circuit has broken with that line of cases by holding that an
individual is not liable under section 16(b) for profits resulting from
a sale of securities which was completed within six months of the
purchase, and by which the individual obtained an initial ten per-
cent ownership interest in those securities.
It is submitted that the Provident Securities decision was cor-
rect in view of proper canons of statutory construction, the actual
policy underlying section 16(b), and recent illuminating dicta from
98 506 F.2d at 609.
99 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 	 240.10b-5 (1974), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
1 " ALI Federal Securities Code, Tenative Draft No. 2, Pt. XIV § 1413(d), at 129
(March 1973).
'°' Id. § 1413, Comment (6)(a), at 134.
1 °2 See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co,, 404 U.S. 418, 427 (1972).
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the Supreme Court. The conclusive presumption of use of inside
information under section 16(b) should not be extended to cover an
initial purchase of a ten percent interest, since at the time of that
purchase, the individual did not enjoy the relationship with the
issuer which, under the statute's terms, would facilitate access to
such information. Finally, it is suggested that the courts should leave
any expansion of section 16(b) coverage to Congress and that the
role of the courts should be confined to effectuating the plain lan-
guage of the statute in its present form.
JOSEPH PIZZURRO
Civil Procedure—Diversity Actions—Conflict Between Federal
Rule and State Law with Direct Substantive Effect--Marshall v.
Mulrenin. ' —Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Marshall, brought suit for
personal injuries in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts on grounds of diversity. Named as defendants in
the suit were Mr. and Mrs. Kirk, who at the time of the accident
were the record owners of the property on which the injury oc-
curred. Shortly after the applicable Massachusetts statute of limita-
tions had expired, 2
 plaintiffs learned that Mr. and Mrs. Mulrenin,
rather than the Kirks, had actually been the owners of the property
at the time of accident. Upon learning this fact, plaintiffs moved to
amend their complaint by replacing the Kirks with the Mulrenins as
the named defendants. However, since the Mulrenins had not been
notified of the suit until after the statute had run, the district court
held that the amendment was impermissible. 3 The grounds for the
court's holding were that the requirements set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c)4
 for the relation back of amendments had
' 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974).
2
 In diversity actions, since federal courts must apply state substantive law, the same
statute of limitations must be applied that would be applied if the case were being tried in
state court because a statute of limitations has a direct substantive effect. Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
3 508 F.2d at 40-41. According to the certificate on file in the appropriate town hall, Mr.
and Mrs. Kirk were the owners of the business premises upon which the plaintiff-wife fell. In
fact, however, the Kirks had sold the premises to Mr. and Mrs. Mulrenin several years before
the accident occurred but had neglected to file, in violation of Massachusetts law, a notice of
discontinuance. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110, 4 5 (Supp. 1975). When plaintiffs instituted their
suit, one month before the statute of limitations was due to expire, they relied upon the
certificate in naming the Kirks as defendants. Not until after the statute had run did the
plaintiffs learn that the Mulrenins had actually been the owners at the time of the accident.
508 F.2d at 41.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides in pertinent part:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
. . . within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the
party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution
of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits,
and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. . .
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